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CONTENDING ARAB VISIONS
Emmanuel Sivan
I. Myths on the Decline
These are not easy times for pan-Arab nationalism, the hege-
monic ideology in the Middle East. Three of its major myths
have withered in the harsh winds of the last quarter-century.
The first to be hit was the myth of “Arab Piedmont and Prus-
sia.” As an ethnic-cultural nationalist movement, Arabism got
much of its inspiration from nineteenth-century European
nationalism, especially from the Italian and German experi-
ences. In 1940 Sati’ al-Husri had already drawn a pivotal lesson
from that experience, namely that it is not enough to build from
below through education and the organizing of civil society.
Given the deep chasms within the Arab world, it is incumbent to
have a solid territorial basis, i.e., a state strongly committed to
Arab unification and headed by a powerful leader. Such a state
should be ready and capable to serve as a magnet for those ludi-
crous fragments of Arab political entities to appeal directly to
the masses and, if need be, impose itself with their help upon
these statelets. The only Arab candidate to fulfill this role,
played by Piedmont in Italy and by Prussia in Germany, was
Egypt. Husri had no doubt about that, impressed as he was by
Egypt’s demographic and cultural weight, geopolitical location,
and military potential.
Nasser inherited this vision and tried to implement it. The
1967 Arab-Israeli War was evidently a severe blow for the
dream of Egyptian leadership, yet the quest for an “Arab Prus-
sia” remained alive. As Sadat’s Egypt followed a separatist path,
the believers of Arabism had to look elsewhere. Qaddafi
attempted in vain to cloak himself with the leader’s mantle, but
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it was apparent that his resources were too paltry. Syria could
have assumed the leadership, but Assad, always the paragon of
realpolitik, had learned the lesson of Nasser’s failure and cir-
cumscribed the horizon of his ambitions; since 1974, the Ba’thist
regime turned to the path of al-Sham, or “Greater Syria” — a
revised version of Antun Sa’adeh’s concept (minus Cyprus).
And then, to the pan-Arabist’s relief, Saddam Hussein rose in
the late 1970s and took up in Iraq’s name the scepter of the
supreme commander of the struggle for unity.
Like his role model, Nasser, Hussein tried to exploit the con-
frontation with an external enemy so as to generate internal soli-
darity upon which to build his hegemony. The confrontation led
to a war that ended in defeat and ignominy. In accordance with
Karl Marx’s dictum, history repeated itself twice: once as a
tragedy (1967) and once as a farce (1991). A patent truth was
exposed: Iraq and its ruler were a giant with feet of clay, and
when that giant crumbled down, there was no pretendant to the
title of “Arab Prussia.”
The second myth to be dissipated was that of “artificial bor-
ders.” This is how pan-Arabists dubbed the demarcation lines
separating political entities created in the Middle East upon the
ruins of the Ottoman Empire: artificial — for they were nothing
but the product of imperialism and its native henchmen, the
reactionary Arab regimes. The dual pressures of the Arab
masses from down below and Arab Piedmont and Prussia from
above were supposed to erase these borders and reunite the
Arab-speaking lands.
It is in the name of this myth that Saddam Hussein justified
his invasion into Kuwait and its subsequent annexation in
August 1990. For could one imagine a better example of an
utterly artificial British creation than this despicable emirate,
which Iraq had always considered part and parcel of its histori-
cal territory? Arab public opinion, including that of most intel-
lectuals, applauded the annexation. And no wonder — the
myth’s hold was still powerful. Other territorial entities in the
Middle East have acquired some legitimacy over the past half-
century, but Kuwait and the other Gulf emirates (and to some
extent Jordan and Lebanon as well) remained suspect, a
memento of an era of weakness and subservience, a reminder of
the “divide and rule” policy imposed by colonial powers.
Macalester International Vol. 4
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The myth should already have been called into question at the
time of the Iran – Iraq War, for a major aim of the Iraqi invasion
in September 1980 was to take over the oil-rich province of
Khuzistan, defined as “Arab” (and Iraqi) territory due to the fact
that it is populated by Arab-speakers. Yet, surprisingly enough,
the Khuzistan inhabitants did not take up cudgels for Hussein
and stayed loyal to Iran. This aspect of the war barely received
any media coverage, however, and thus saved the pan-Arabists
from any gnawing doubts.
A decade later, the Kuwait annexation laid bare an astound-
ing state of affairs: despite the reactionary regime, the local pop-
ulation adamantly refused to collaborate with Hussein. The
Iraqi ruler could not even establish a puppet regime. Kuwaiti
society, however lacking in a tradition of voluntaristic associa-
tion, organized civil disobedience, nay even armed resistance, in
the face of ruthless Iraqi repression.
It became strikingly evident that even entities founded artifi-
cially, such as Kuwait, may, as has so often happened in Africa,
develop a community predicated upon a common attachment to
territory, upon a collective memory, and upon a cultural variant
of the Arab-Islamic civilization. Otherwise put, they seek to
become nation-states, states the citizens are willing to die for. If
this was the case in Kuwait, it was all the more so in Jordan,
whose inhabitants withstood the crucial loyalty test of “Black
September” (1971), and in a fortiori entities with deep historical
roots such as Syria, Algeria, and Sudan. Another refutation of
the myth has been recently added: the disruption of Yemeni
unity in May 1994 and the subsequent breakout of civil war
between north and south along boundaries laid down by British
imperialism.
Last but not least came the turn of a third Arab myth, “the
common interests.” Following the 1967 debacle and the rise of
Arab territorial states in the 1970s, an alternative path for unity
was pro-Syria in the anti-Hussein camp.
All these contradictions were laid bare in a most virulent fash-
ion in late 1990, when Saudi, Egyptian, and Syrian forces were
positioned in battle formation, flanked by Western forces,
against Iraq and its Arab allies. And subsequent to the war, the
mass expulsion of Palestinian residents from Kuwait and of
Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia has provided yet another
Emmanuel Sivan
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refutation of the “common interests” myth. Such commonality
was bluntly sacrificed for the sake of territorial-state homogene-
ity and internal security.
A third major Arab myth expired in the sands of the penin-
sula.
By the same time, an additional pan-Arab dream was in the
process of dying out. Given its populist nature, representing, so
to speak, the innate nature and urging of the masses, pan-Ara-
bism was supposed to democratize politics. No wonder, then,
that pan-Arab regimes, Nasser’s, and the Ba’th (as well as
Yemen, Algeria, and Libya) were self-styled people’s republics.
Yet it became evident time after time that all these regimes,
whatever the sincere idealism of their founders, ended up as
tyrannies, no different than the conservative regimes they
despised. The sense of disillusionment was best expressed by
the Syrian poet Nizzar Qabbani, who followed his famous ode
“Lamentation on the Demise of Arabism”1 with this one titled
“Top Secret Memorandum”:2
Do you know who I am?
A citizen who lives in Qam’istan [land of repression]
A land the major export item of which
Are leather bags
Made of human flesh
Oh, Allah, what a time
We live in. . .
Do you want to know about Qam’istan,
That stretch of land extending
From North Africa to Naftistan [the oil states];
From the shores of dictatorship
To the shores of slaughter;
Where rulers weigh heavily from time immemorial
Upon the necks of their subjects
Boring out the eyes of their children
Hating the paper, the pen, and the writer.
And what is article number one
In its constitution?
Herewith we render null and void
Man’s need to speak,
To express himself.
Oh, Allah, what a time
We live in. . .
Macalester International Vol. 4
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Do you know who I am?
A citizen of Qam’istan
A citizen
Who dreams that one day
He’ll be upgraded to animal.
A citizen afraid to sit in a café
Lest the state check
The dregs of his coffee cup;
A citizen afraid to get near his wife
Without the protection of the security services.
A citizen I am, son of the Qam’istan people,
Shuddering like a leaf in the storm
Before entering a mosque
Lest some secret agent report
That I’ve read Koranic verses there
Oh, Allah, what a time
We live in. . .
Do you know what is Qam’istan?
A satanic state
And what is the nature of this fabulous land?
One wants there to go to the loo,
he must get a governmental decree.
A couple want to procreate,
They need an officially stamped license
The policeman forbids
The hair of the beloved
To swing in the wind
Unless it has a license, a decree
Oh, Allah, what a time
We live in.
II. The Rise of the Nation-State
While pan-Arabism still enjoys the support of quite a few intel-
lectuals, most Arab elites have forsaken it — in actual fact if not
in rhetoric. Most of these elites are somewhat confused as to the
nature of the regional system in which they operate. Two impor-
tant and vociferous minority groups, however, put forward
clear-cut alternatives to pan-Arabism, namely Radical Islam and
Middle Easternism. Their struggle for hegemony will be
described further on. But first we have to emphasize that both
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groups concur that the nation-states are the sole effective collec-
tive entities in the region and that they enjoy a substantial mea-
sure of legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens/subjects. While
the regimes have recourse to sticks (repression and deterrence
by the ever-present security services) as well as to carrots (client
networks of people employed in public administration and in
the public sector, the recipients of soft loans, import licenses,
etc.), they skillfully use this legitimacy of the state, a legitimacy
predicated upon a bond between residents and territory pre-
sented by local elites as having deep historical roots, and one
that occurs even in states that are, in fact, the product of the
colonial partition and/or the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. A
huge educational effort has been conducted to inculcate the
views of these societies-at-large with a striking degree of suc-
cess.
Indeed, the regimes tend more and more to speak openly, and
without reservations or qualms, in the name of what one may
dub the “egotism of the nation-state.” Thus, President Assad or
King Hussein explain their respective strategies toward post-
war Iraq or toward Israel in terms of the interests of Syria or Jor-
dan. Only in the margin do they pay lip service to the
“commitment to our Arab brothers.” The disappearance of the
cleavage between “progressive” and “conservative” Arab
regimes — manifest long before the end of the Cold War —
makes the regional rules of the game reflect realpolitik rather
than ideology. Moreover, no regional actor actually aspires to
hegemony anymore. Iraq lost its ambitions with the 1991 defeat;
Syria lost its with the demise of the Soviet Union, its protector;
Egypt still entertains some such aspirations yet has to confront a
depressing chasm between them and its laggard economy.
The best way to seize the centrality of the nation-state in col-
lective consciousness is to look at symbols and rituals of the var-
ious countries of the region. Perhaps the most readily available
are postage stamps and bank notes, all issued by the holder of
sovereignty and all objects of daily use.
If we examine stamps from Egypt (the first sovereign Arab
state [1921]), we see that the Pharaonic past — which is pre-
Islamic and pre-Arab — is the most common iconic representa-
tion, whether under the monarchy or after the 1952 Revolution.
Macalester International Vol. 4
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Is it just because of the physical presence of the Pyramids on the
landscape? Is it just an aesthetic choice?
This is not the case with stamps from Syria, a country where
vestiges of the past are less prominent and where the regime’s
pan-Arab orientation is much more deeply rooted. Even after
the rise to power of the Ba’th Party in 1963, stamps depicted
Ugaritic and Sumerian sculptures and Hellenistic and Roman
reconstructed temples, despite their lack of reference to an Arab
or Islamic past. This is undoubtedly a political act interwoven
with a perception of the character of a certain delimited territory
in the region.
Iraq, under its own Ba’th Party, has been involved in a much
more intensive effort to put into sharp relief its ancient
Mesopotamian identity, and it has done so not merely in stamps
and bank notes, but also through public festivals, a minute
reconstruction of the city of Babylon, and investment in archaeo-
logical digs. The same picture repeats itself in various other
countries, whether they be the product of an imperialistic parti-
tion (Jordan and Kuwait) or have precolonial existence
(Morocco and Algeria) or even deep roots anchored in ancient
history and/or geography (Tunisia). What is common to all
cases is that the modern state in the region saw as its supreme
duty and necessity the development among its subjects/citizens
of an affective affiliation to territory.
The modern state exerted this effort even in periods when this
very territory was considered by some elites to be but a part of a
larger whole (Greater Syria, a reconstructed Caliphate). The rea-
son is evident: the territory in question, however exiguous, was
the only real estate in its possession, the sole piece of land where
the state had an effective monopoly. The larger whole, be it pan-
Arab, pan-Islamic, etc., was — and still is — a dream, a political
project. Anchoring the collective consciousness in the givens of
the here and now was vitally important, even in eras when the
state (e.g., Egypt under Nasser) attempted to pursue this dream,
and all the more so when it relinquished the effort (e.g., under
Sadat), perceiving it as unrealistic. Both leaders and the upper
echelons of the administration — those who supervise the issue
of bank notes and stamps, organize public festivals, and so on—
were and are aware of these imperatives. Their propagation
among the population at large was and is greatly facilitated by
Emmanuel Sivan
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the need felt by subjects/citizens to experience a fit (or close cor-
relation) between the present as lived—i.e., within defined terri-
torial boundaries—and the past as they remember it (or as they
were taught to remember it). In other words, there was a dire
psychological need to avoid facing up to a cognitive dissonance
between reality and collective consciousness.
The very fact that the modern state was involved in develop-
ing its territorial identity, creating a linkage between memory
and polity, created ingredients of a collective consciousness (or
collective imagination, if you will). In other words, it laid the
foundations of a nation-state. For what is a nation-state but a ter-
ritorial state (be it originally dynastic or foreign-imposed)
endowed with a collective memory? These ingredients had
already been constituted, as we could see in the celebration of
the pre-Arab, ancient past. When pan-Arabism began to decline,
the sole political force capable of taking its place was, thus, the
nation-state in the making. Even the only state supporting pan-
Arabism wholeheartedly today — Libya — depicts on its stamps
Hannibal, that “quintessential Libyan hero, champion of the
fight against Imperialism — Roman in ancient times, American
today.”
The persistence of the effort of nation-state building over the
last six or seven decades is likewise evident when one examines
how nineteenth- and twentieth-century history is represented
on bank notes and stamps. Virtually all heroes and events cele-
brated at a given time are related to the territorial framework of
the state that issued them. The continuity between the trajectory
followed by various regimes in one and the same country is too
uniformly striking to be coincidental. Egypt still commemorates,
as it did under the monarchy, Muhammad Ali, perhaps not as
founder of the dynasty but certainly as the founder of modern
Egypt. The same goes for Arabi Pasha, leader of the 1882 revolt
against the British, and Mustafa Kamil, who laid the founda-
tions of modern Egyptian nationalism. Even Saddam Hussein’s
Iraq returned to commemorating King Faysal I, while continu-
ing the cult of the popular rebellion of 1920.
More telling, perhaps, is the fact that although towering writ-
ers are read beyond state borders by all educated Arab-speak-
ers, each state celebrates only those born on its territory. The
same goes for artists, notably popular singers, who were lis-
Macalester International Vol. 4
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tened to everywhere long before the age of satellite television
and the video cassette. None but Egypt would celebrate Umm
Kulthun; none but Lebanon would do so for Fayrouz. Even a
thinker like Sati’ al-Husri, who had a deep influence upon all
currents of pan-Arabism almost everywhere, is commemorated
solely in Iraq, where he lived after the fall of the Ottoman
Empire.
So much for continuity of effort. What about the situation
today?
A good vantage point from which to observe this issue is pro-
vided by the public calendars of the various states. Bank notes
and stamps are examples of the visual symbols of the state festi-
vals, and holidays are its rituals; that is, they are symbol-laden
social activities, stylized, repetitive, and designed to formulate
the boundaries and meaning of collective identity. They are
located in acyclical time and constitute its set-apart, quasi-
sacred high points.
Leafing through the calendars, one readily perceives that
there are two sets of public holidays — religious and secular —
regulated by two distinct time-computation systems, the Hijri
(Muslim) system for virtually all religious holidays (except in
Lebanon) and the Gregorian for secular ones. All secular holi-
days are intertwined with the state and bespeak its modern
character. Religious ones testify to Islam as a bedrock of tradi-
tional identity. They are quite often manipulated by the state,
especially in monarchies and emirates, but in recent years also
by self-styled progressive republics (as part and parcel of the
fight against Radical Islam, which I will discuss at a later point).
What is striking about secular public calendars today is the
almost complete disappearance of holidays and festivals refer-
ring to themes not intimately related to the past or to other con-
cerns of the territory/state in question. Precious few pan-Arab
holidays are still celebrated. Ba’th Day is still celebrated on April
7 in Iraq and Syria, but each state mixes the pan-Arab rhetoric
with claims to its own (Iraqi or Syrian) “pioneering role” in fur-
thering the Cause. In Egypt, Unity Day died, after some agony,
following the disruption of the short-lived United Arab Repub-
lic (UAR) in 1961; the same holds true for Syria.
The type of events celebrated has become almost identical:
Independence Day, events on the route to independence, Mar-
Emmanuel Sivan
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tyrs Day, Army Day, etc., each related to the specific history of
the state in question. Only Revolution Day distinguishes
between republics and monarchies, but even the republics
(Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Sadat’s Egypt) have recently instituted
quasi-monarchical public rituals such as the (current) ruler’s
birthday, Accession Day (a.k.a. Corrective Movement Day) to
celebrate his seizure of power (usually by coup d’état), and so
on.
A nation-state secular religion is thus rising to prominence in
the Middle East, in twenty-odd varieties, in part due to persis-
tent efforts of certain elites over many decades but also due to
the implosion of pan-Arabism under the pressure of its own
contradictions and illusions. This implosion has rid those
nation-states (e.g., Syria, Egypt, and Iraq), which were also
paragons of pan-Arabism, of an inherent tension between their
Qawmi (Arab) and Watani (territorial) dimensions of identity.
That very implosion was a boon for all states whose pan-Arab
credentials had been suspect, e.g., the monarchies and emirates.
Last but not least, it has taken some of the pressure off of non-
Arab minorities within the existing states (e.g., Berbers in Alge-
ria and Morocco, and Kurds in Iraq and Syria), who can now lay
better claim to participation in the political community.
Yet this relative success does not come without a price. New
problems arise. New tensions come to the fore. While ethnic and
linguistic minorities are better off, religious minorities (espe-
cially the various Christian denominations) find themselves in a
more precarious situation. The nation-state, which in principle
recognizes native-born Christians as endowed with rights equal
to those of Muslims born and bred on the same soil, is, in fact,
constrained to make concessions to Radical Islam, which denies
this equality. Moreover, even the state’s public face (i.e., cere-
monies, symbols, rhetoric, and, above all, education) is incre-
mentally Islamized due to the same kind of concessions. That
such a situation owes more to political expediency than to con-
viction on the part of the state is cold comfort for non-Muslims.
A still more important tension results from the fact that the
nation-state has no vision of the regional system, other than as
an arena where the egotism of each state reigns supreme, sub-
ject, of course, to realpolitik constraints. But what exactly are the
rules of engagement? What constitutes a reasonable, common-
Macalester International Vol. 4
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sensical constraint? All this is left in the void. In the age of pan-
Arabism there was a distinct regional vision; rules were more or
less agreed to, at least among pan-Arabist regimes, albeit not
always adhered to. What might develop now on the ruins of
Arabism is a Hobbesian Middle East.
It is this nightmarish anarchy that the two minor contenders
to hegemony attempt to prevent. These two new political forces
are Radical Islam and Middle Easternism. It is to these two that I
now turn.
III. Radical Islam
Radical Islam is by no means identical to Islam. There surely are
other forces operating in Muslim lands: conservative (Saudi
Arabia), moderate modernizers (the Egyptian political elite),
and liberal (losing ground, but still present in intellectual cir-
cles). Yet Radical Islam is the most dynamic political social force
upon the Muslim scene — it sets the agenda for all the others,
spearheads the opposition in most countries, and holds power
in two of them (Iran and Sudan).
The common ideology of the radicals can be subsumed as fol-
lows.
• Diagnosis: Islam is in mortal danger of extinction, not by
invasion and conquest as in the past but by “West-toxication”
(gharbazadagi in Persian; istighrab in Arabic); that is, through
infatuation with modern, secularist, materialist ideas and
ways of life. These ideas and modes of living are of Western
origin (with roots in the Enlightenment), yet they are spread
today by false (as well as naïve) Muslims. The most effective
mechanism for this euthanasia (Greek for “easy death”) is the
state with its monopoly on lawmaking, education, the media,
the economy, and the repressive apparatus.
• The Cure: True-blue Muslims must secede and organize
themselves in voluntary associations (jama’at) outside the
reach of the state. These autonomous enclaves should then
proceed to conquer the state — by spreading the realm of the
“enclave,” by lobbying and pressuring the elites, by entering
parliament and investing in other elected bodies (professional
and trade associations), by hoping to win a majority, by terror
Emmanuel Sivan
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aimed at destabilization, and, ultimately, by direct seizure of
powers. The dosage of means is to be left to pragmatic consid-
erations, but whatever the dosage concocted, it should be pre-
ceded by an in-depth propaganda effort so as to delegitimate
the powers that be, which should be presented as lackeys of
the West as well as of hedonistic, secularized modernity. They
are indeed the enemies of Islam and, hence, infidel. The best
index of their infidelity is that they do not apply Islamic Law.
This ideology is upheld by those whom some Western observers
call “moderates” as well as by those they dub “extremists.”
From the movement’s own viewpoint, these distinctions are
immaterial. “We are zealots (muta’assibun) not extremists
(mutatarrifun),” is its slogan. To raise the moderate/extremist
distinction is to disregard the fact that the choice of “cure” is
definitely pragmatic and depends upon the circumstances: pos-
sibilities of penetrating the political structure, the efficacy of
repression, the leeway for freedom of expression and associa-
tion, the existence (or not) of a socioeconomic crisis (Iran, Alge-
ria), and the availability of allies in the military and security
forces.
Whatever the exact modus operandi, the aim—seizing politi-
cal power and establishing a regime governed by Islamic Law
(Shari’a)—is the same.
Moreover, to raise such a distinction belies ignorance of the
premodern roots of the ideology, i.e., the doctrine of al-amr bi-l-
ma’ruf wa-l-nahy ‘an al-munkar, as well as of the social practice of
vigilante action derived therefrom and prevalent in the Islamic
world at least from the fourteenth century onward. This doc-
trine-cum-practice was transformed into the twentieth-century
radical variety because the danger has become more acute. It is
no more a matter of fighting against believers who transgress
precepts and rebuking negligent rulers. The state itself has
become an active agent of alien (formerly colonial) ideas; the
impact is not just on tiny elites but on the bulk of the population,
those “brainwashed by media”; and the regimes do not operate
as a “watch dog state” but rather attempt to shape all walks of
life and even invade the private domain.
The doctrine of al-amr bi-l-ma’ruf calls for combating the dan-
ger to the Faith “by hand or mouth” (force or persuasion),
Macalester International Vol. 4
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according to the circumstances. This is why Radical Islamic
movements fluctuate over time between reform and revolution,
propaganda and violence, or, as they dub it, between da’wa and
jihad. The two modes are closely related, and in many move-
ments there are even parallel apparatus to deal with them. In the
course of the 1980s, some movements turned from reformist to
terrorist-revolutionary (Algeria and Gaza), others moved in the
opposite direction (Tunisia), and still others preserve both
modes of action (Egypt and Jordan).
Radical Islam has not succeeded in seizing power except in
Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan, while participating in the ruling
coalition in Yemen as a junior partner. Everywhere else it is in
opposition, quite often forced underground (Syria, Iraq, Algeria,
and Tunisia). But whether aboveground or under, it tends to
spearhead the opposition and to hold cultural hegemony, in the
sense that Radical Islamic discourse determines the way public,
especially political, questions are being formulated. Quite often
it also controls the way some (not all) questions are being
answered, e.g., on the issues of women and minorities (which I
will discuss later).
Yet, Radical Islam’s success is due not merely to intellectual
attraction. It possesses undeniable communication skills,
adroitly manipulating a bedrock political language with deep
historical and plebeian resonances but vehiculated through
modern media, particularly the audio/video tape cassette (and
going as far as using the fax machine, satellite television, pirate
radio, and the Internet). It thereby circumvents the state’s
monopoly on television and gives civil society, hitherto mute or
muzzled, a voice. Indeed, it is in the reinvigoration of civil soci-
ety — which had suffered attrition and later destruction at the
hands of the regimes of the past century—that Radical Islam has
drawn much of its holding power. It is civil society, where it cre-
ated free spaces (e.g., private mosques, professional organiza-
tions, trade unions, clinics, savings and loan associations,
Islamic banks, schools), that provides fundamentalism with an
ever-flowing reservoir of new recruits, enabling it to infiltrate
every nook and cranny. This success in the sphere of voluntary
organizations is not something to be sneezed at. Such organiza-
tions tend to be rare in the world of Islam today (one per 50,000
inhabitants, compared to a ratio of 1:1,000 in Europe and 1:3,000
Emmanuel Sivan
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in East Asia). Although the success of these organizations is due
in great part to the inventiveness and initiative of the Radicals,
the crisis of the present nation-state is also an important factor.
In effect, the nation-state in the Middle East and North Africa
is more often than not a combination of rentier state and welfare
state. As a rentier it draws most of its resources from its monop-
oly on certain precious minerals (oil, natural gas, phosphates,
etc.) and major waterways (e.g., Suez Canal); from subsidies
from foreign powers (United States, USSR, Saudi Arabia, and
the Gulf emirates); as well from remittances from its emigrant
workers. As such it does not rely heavily upon taxation and has
no reason to be attentive to the wishes of civil society. With this
society, the regimes have a tacit covenant, according to which
they provide their subjects with free (or subsidized) basic sta-
ples, education, housing, medical services, and welfare trans-
fers; in return, the subjects acquiesce to a curtailment of human
and civil rights. This tacit covenant could no longer be held after
the decline of oil prices in the international market (in the late
1970s and mid-1980s ), the eviction of migrant workers after the
Gulf War, and the breakup of the USSR. As outside sources of
income dwindled, the state — whose economic policy consisted
of “imported development without growth” — faced bank-
ruptcy, a situation that became all the more acute as fertility
rates remained high while mortality declined (due to better
medical services and nutrition).
The state could no longer uphold its end of the bargain; its
welfare functions were increasingly deficient, thus creating a
social climate conducive to mass protests, which were soon
staged by Radical Muslim activists holding a religious discourse
of social justice. Yet the militants did more than just preach.
They moved quickly into the vacuum created by the bankruptcy
of the nation-state. Their existing network of associations
(jama’at) focused on the propagation of the faith (da’wa), using
well the free mosques and free schools and clinics they had
slowly developed over the years. They quickly expanded the
nebula of voluntary associations and thus created a solid social
base, especially among those most heavily hit by the enduring
crisis (urban lower-middle class, proletariat, and unemployed
university and high-school graduates) — namely those frus-
trated by the modernization preached by the nation-state.
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Within their association, the Radicals evolved an egalitarian
structure, loose yet supple, that provided urban dwellers and
recent rural migrants suffering from anomie with a sense of soli-
darity and empowerment otherwise lacking in their lives. Deci-
sion-making in these groups is not stifled by this structure, as
the groups are led by charismatic individuals revered for their
learning and moral probity.
All this is not to say that Radical Islamic success is due essen-
tially to communication, economics, and organization. The
“vision thing” is crucial. The state, no longer in possession of an
uplifting ideal like pan-Arabism, makes too many compromises
with Islamic lingo and laws to be credible. Moreover, it is per-
ceived as being too elitist and remote. The Radicals, on the other
hand, have a message that is clear, simple, and grounded in a
popular Islamic discourse about identity and social justice that
has informed these societies over the centuries and has never
really been eradicated by the modernizers. That message is that
modernist moral depravity is the source of all social ills, and the
Radicals skillfully play on a combination of private frustrations
(unemployment; poor housing; steep dowries which impede
marriage) and public ones (crime; higher rates of celibacy; sex-
ual harassment in the congested public transportation) to make
their point. The sole solution, they say, is the application of 
Shari’a (Islamic Law).
Where does the challenge of Radical Islam actually lie? A
close scrutiny of the record of the Radicals in power (Iran and
Sudan), their intra-movement methods, and indoctrination of
their troops in opposition suggests the following.
First, these movements deny the validity of human rights,
especially with regard to the social groups in the lands of Islam
that are traditionally discriminated against: women and non-
Muslim minorities. For example, after 1979 the Iranian govern-
ment reduced the age of marriage to thirteen, rendered licit
“provisional” marriage (i.e., short-term concubinage), abolished
wife-initiated divorce, curtailed a divorced woman’s alimony,
etc. The platform of the “moderate” Muslim Brethren in the
Egyptian parliament contains similar measures. At the same
time, Islamic militants in Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Morocco, and
elsewhere have put pressure, often violently, on women to cover
themselves up with the tentlike Islamic garb (a.k.a, Chador or
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Niqab) or, at the very least, the veil (Hijab); they forcibly stop
them from attending “sex-mixed” halls (lecture rooms, cinemas,
ballrooms, etc.); and offer female students segregated shuttle
buses. These militants fight implacably state-sponsored cam-
paigns for family planning and preach to young women the
gospel of nurturing as woman’s first, God-instituted role even if
she is educated; work, not career, is what they say she should
aspire to. She must resign herself to being of a different mold,
never fully equal to Man, the family’s provider. They support
Shari’a laws that allow a woman only half of a man’s share in
inheritance and that decree that the testimony of two women
equal that of one man. These laws are already the case in Iran,
Sudan, and Afghanistan and are likely to be instituted else-
where when the militants take power.
Nor do the Radicals believe in the freedom of religious
expression. Baha’is are persecuted in Iran; Christians and
Pagans in Southern Sudan are the victims of a vicious war per-
petrated by the Islamist regime of Sheikh Hasan al-Turabi;
Palestinian Christians are harassed by Hamas; and Copts in
Upper Egypt are murdered.
Second, Radical Islam, even when it plays the parliamentary
game in opposition, does not believe in democracy but rather in
“one man, one vote, one time.” We have seen this in operation in
Iran and Sudan, where single-party, repressive regimes were
established. And one hears the same note in intra-movement
tapes of oppositionary radicals: “enemies of Islam” (i.e., secular-
ists and liberals) should be outlawed and refused access to the
media; parliament has to install the God-given Shari’a, which, of
course, cannot then be abrogated, and the Shura (consultation)
doctrine they refer to means consultation of Islamic elites,
namely Ulama and mollahs (men of religion). This is what Shura
meant throughout history; this is also what it means in present-
day Iran. Shura does not equal democracy. One should add that
the way the movements themselves are governed inside is
strictly authoritarian, even dictatorial. Dissent is prohibited; ide-
ological deviants are persecuted and sometimes killed.
In public utterances, especially to the gullible Western media,
Islamic leaders sometimes speak of their commitment to democ-
racy, pluralism, and human and civil rights. Yet in their preach-
ing inside the movement — which one can listen to on
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audiocassettes—they show their true colors: democracy is tanta-
mount to apostasy, and when and if they get to power through
the ballot box, they must apply the rule of “one man, one vote,
one time.”
Last but not least, the Radicals have distinct notions of their
own about the emerging world and regional order. They are
staunchly opposed to the concept of the New World Order, as
envisioned by Gorbachev and Bush, a concept that assumes that
the world of the 1990s is so interdependent (in economics, the
environment, immigration, and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction) that conflicts are particularly dangerous and
must be avoided through consensus and peaceful resolution.
Islamic Radicalism rejects this emerging world order as a West-
ern ploy to preserve its dominance and believes that peaceful
resolution of conflicts is an illusion because international rela-
tions are inherently conflictual. Jihad (holy war) theory rightly
describes international relations as they are, namely as a sort of
Hobbesian jungle. Conflict is and will be the norm, at least until
the arrival of the Mahdi (messiah) in the End of Times.
The Radicals believe, then, that Holy Combat for the Cause of
Allah is the only recourse the Muslim world has in response to
the current regimes, which are dominated by Western ideals.
Only when these regimes are toppled and the unity of the Mus-
lim Umma (community of the believers) is restored, as in the
Golden Age of the Caliphate, can peaceful relations within the
Umma be reinstated. (The Caliphate is not expected to come
back, however; its modern equivalent would consist of a loose
federation of Islamized regimes, each governing one of the pre-
sent nation-states. Loyalty, of course, would be first and fore-
most to Islam, not to the state.)
It is no small wonder, then, that for Islamic Radicalism the
current regional system of realpolitik is predicated upon the
dominance of “Apostate,” West-toxicated Arab regimes. Yet, by
the same token, Radicals reject the contending concept of “Mid-
dle Easternism.” Middle Easternism accepts the assumptions of
the New World Order and implies the legitimacy of the exe-
crated Arab regimes and the secularized, atheistic Turkey and
infidel Israel. It is this unholy alliance of apostates and disbeliev-
ers that is seen to account for foreign rule over Islamic holy
places, and repression and persecution of faithful Muslims.
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Consequently, the economic growth promised by Middle East-
ernism is a false promise designed to dull criticism of the West
and erode Islamic morality (through interest taking, the values
of the consumer society, permissiveness, and particularly the
spread of alcohol and drugs).
While its major contender, Middle Easternism, recruits
mostly among the elites and the middle classes, Radical Islam
has a reservoir, or recruitment pool, drawn from alienated
youth: high-school and university graduates who are un- or
underemployed, rural immigrants in search of a support group
in an alien milieu, and professionals kept out of the closed deci-
sion-making circles in their own trade. The existence of the pool
should be traced back to the dysfunctions of the modern states
in the Middle East and North Africa: stagnant economic growth,
spiralling population, unbridled exodus from countryside to
metropolis (rather than to medium-sized towns), a bloated but
underfinanced educational system, tyranny and the withering
of civil society, and foreign conquest (Afghanistan, Bosnia,
Palestine, and Lebanon). When dysfunction turns into structural
crisis (Iran, Sudan, Algeria, and, for a while, Tunisia), the Radi-
cals may develop a cross-class recruitment, including individu-
als from among the traditional middle class as well as parts of
the modern middle class (especially professionals).
It is thus the dysfunctions of the present Arab socioeconomic
system that replenish the Radical pool despite a high turnover
rate caused by attrition and repression. As such, Radical Islamic
views are bound to continue to be in vogue well into the next
century.
IV. Middle Easternism
What about the other contender for hegemony? The concept of a
Middle Eastern Common Market, or Middle Easternism for
short, was first launched by Mustafa al-Fiqqi, an Egyptian intel-
lectual and diplomat and currently Egyptian Ambassador to
Vienna, in a controversial best-selling book entitled Al-Sharq
Awsatiyya that created a major discussion at the 1993 Cairo Book
Fair.3 It produced a ripple effect and gained many a spokesper-
son from Morocco to the Gulf, particularly among economists,
journalists, academics, and parts of the modern middle class.
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Ranking politicians who support it include Crown Prince Has-
san of Jordan as well as Usama al-Baz, President Mubarak’s
closest advisor.
Middle Easternism argues that the region constitutes a geopo-
litical unit, whose main actors are the states, characterized by
strong interdependence. These components encompass the
Arab-speaking states as well as Turkey, Iran, and Israel. The cor-
nerstones of regional stability are to be the principles of peaceful
resolution of interstate conflicts, the search for consensus, and
the nonexclusion of any state from the framework of this con-
sensus; in other terms, one must apply to the Middle East the
rules of the emerging New World Order, putting an end to the
region’s exceptionalism, to its tradition of exclusivity, and to
conflict. Joining the New World Order would enable the region
to join the new global market and hence create real economic
growth, which is inevitably export-oriented.
It follows, then, that regional, interest-based cooperation is
bound to be for the benefit of all concerned. It is also argued that
consensus is not just an ideal target but a laudable goal within
the realm of possibility. For even states considered in the past to
be problematic (e.g., Israel until the Sadat initiative, Iran under
Khomeini) are now within the fold, all the more so after the Oslo
peace process. All arrangements should be achieved through
initiatives coming from within the region, not from outside
(and, needless to say, not imposed by nonregional actors).
The instruments for establishing such a consensus-seeking
should be regional organizations devoted to specific topics that
could elaborate agreements, understandings, and information-
exchange procedures and, ultimately, develop organs for moni-
toring the implementation of these understandings and the
sorting out of disagreements about their interpretation. The
most promising arena seems to be economic cooperation mod-
eled on the European example. The aim is to build up a Com-
mon Middle Eastern Market that might lay the foundation for
developing cooperation in other fields as well.
Quite a number of proponents of this view attach great
importance to the setting up of an Arab subsystem within this
framework: first and foremost in the realms of media and cul-
ture, and, if and where feasible, in economics as well. Such an
agreement may, in some cases, be just a ploy to allay the fears of
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recalcitrant pan-Arabist intellectuals; but in other cases (such as
that of the former left-wing journalist Lufti al-Khuli in Egypt), it
reflects a sincere effort to combine old and new ideas, a cultural
reality (Arab) and a politico-strategic one (Middle Eastern).
Acceptance of the nation-state as a given and the setting aside
of exclusion and conflict — all this, say the Middle Easternists,
would inevitably pave the way to the region’s full-fledged inte-
gration into the emerging New World Order. Economic cooper-
ation, albeit with former enemies, is a positive value, nay even
the only option for countries who want to pull themselves out of
the mire of backwardness and underdevelopment.
While Middle Easternism attracts much attention and enjoys
broadening support, its Achilles’ heel is the nebulous character
of its thinking on organs of cooperation, a weakness that pan-
Arabists and Islamicists hasten to point out: what kind of
treaties/agreements/understandings are to be envisaged on
water, arms control, and so forth? Are economic arrangements
to be bilateral or multilateral? Do we speak of free trade zones or
customs unions? Should one aspire to an association with the
states on the northern shores of the Mediterranean?
Are the Middle Easternists fuzzy thinkers, or are they groping
for real answers in an important search for a bold new regional
order? The jury is still out. However, their obvious indebtedness
to the concept of the New World Order is a sign of pragmatism
and modernity in the eyes of some parts of the Arab-speaking
public; for others, they constitute an omen of dependence and
obsequiousness to the hegemonic West (or to “Great Satan,” the
United States).
One should note, however, that over the last year or so,
attempts have been made by Middle Easternists to render their
vision more precise and realistic by grappling with obstacles
and ambiguities. The highly regarded Egyptian journalist and
thinker Muhammad Sid Ahmad (a former left-wing pan-Ara-
bist) probed the question of a Middle Eastern nuclear-free zone
and other limitations on the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Dr. Taha al-Alim of the Al-Ahram Center for Strate-
gic Studies in Cairo discussed the application to the region not
of the oft-mentioned West European model (which cannot fit a
culturally heterogeneous and much poorer part of the world)
but of the Asian-Pacific one: how cultural and economic discrep-
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ancies may be marshalled into a system based upon growing
cooperation and peaceful resolution of conflicts of interests
without eliminating the possibility that some such conflicts (on
water, for instance, between Turkey and Syria/Iraq and
between Israel and Syria) might become heated at times without
getting out of hand. Dr. Usamah Ghazala Harb, head of the
same center, and Tahsin Bashir, Sadat’s former adviser, ponder
the modalities of free-trade zones (inside the Middle East). Influ-
ential commentators such as the Lebanese Khayr Allah Khayr
Allah and Hazim Saghiya (who write for the London-based Al-
Hayat newspaper), as well as Jordanian analyst Mustafa
Hamarneh and top Egyptian economist Sa’id al-Najjar, discuss
how overall free-trade arrangements may benefit the poorer
partners first (as happened with NAFTA) and how technologi-
cal cooperation (e.g., on water desalinization) may benefit all.
The beginning of this effort was the convening of the Regional
Economic Cooperation Conference in Amman in 1995. Unlike its
predecessor held in Casablanca, the conference in Amman was
modest in scope and aspiration, taking a step-by-step approach
to institution-building while putting the accent on the role of the
private sector, with governments as facilitators. Existing joint
ventures between businessmen from formerly warring countries
in the region, which normally imply substantial technology
transfers, are to be studied in detail so as to draw lessons for
future initiatives.
Still, Middle Easternism remains quite fuzzy and elusive. And
the same criticism could be leveled against Islamism. Most of its
proponents (with the exception of the Islamic Liberation Party)
do not raise the banner of the Caliphate. How, then, would they
insure that nation-state interests, even in the hands of Islamicist
governments, would not clash with the ideals of Muslim soli-
darity? How to bridge the Sunni-Shiite divide? Isn’t their accep-
tance of some of the myths of the nation-states (at least when
they refer to Muslim history) while rejecting others (those of
Pharaonic Egypt, Numidian Algeria, Mesopotamian Iraq,
Ugaritian-Helenistic Syria, and Canaanite Palestine) a doomed
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V. Concluding Remarks
Doubts remain. Fault lines are evident on both sides of the
regional debate. The battle for hearts and minds rages on. But
one must beware of focusing on visions alone. As could be con-
cluded from the above discussion of pan-Arabism, it failed not
so much because of the limitations of its multicultural vision (it
was inclusive of non-Muslims yet rejected linguistic and ethnic
minorities like the Kurds and Berbers and preached a vision of a
primordially Arab region where the Iranian, Turkish, and Jew-
ish states are never full-fledged actors), but because of the basic
deficiency of its Dialogue of Actions — that is, the failure of its
three major myths when put to the harsh the test of reality.
In like manner, the Islamic Radical vision, while inclusive of
ethnic/linguistic minorities, excludes from the multicultural
Umma (the Muslim community/polity) all non-Muslims living
in Islamic lands, relegates Muslim women to an inferior status,
and refuses pluralism (i.e., equal rights for secularists and even
for “tepid believers”). This vision, by and of itself, limits its
appeal, at least among the middle class and parts of the petite
bourgeoisie. Yet it does it no harm among the less-well-off and,
certainly, not among the various victims of modernity. Still, this
in itself points out that to the extent that the deficiencies of the
modern system are somewhat alleviated (e.g., better economic
performance and opening up participation in politics), its attrac-
tion is diminished. By the same token, the deterring example of
the regimes in Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iran (as well as the Shi-
ite character of the latter) do circumscribe its chances. Recourse
to terrorism (against fellow Muslims) and vicious internal
squabbling among Islamic groups work in the same direction.
Economic crisis, unemployment, and foreign occupation work
in favor of Radicalism. In a word, how the movement acts and
what the context of action does may vitiate or augment Radical-
ism’s chances.
The nation-state is, in principle, more inclusive on both ethnic
and religious accounts, yet its actual behavior in these fields
may belie its promises (e.g., Iraq vis-à-vis the Kurds and Shiites,
Syria vis-à-vis the non-Alawite majority). Furthermore, the issue
of democracy still looms large in most countries of the region.
Last but not least, the nation-state’s success hinges upon eco-
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nomics and demography: will it move from “development with-
out growth” to real growth, in the manner of the East Asian
Dragons? Or, will it, in the case of the less-performing countries,
simply reverse the current stagnation? Will the population
growth decline below the fatal 3-percent rate, still common to
most states in the region? And so forth.
In the same vein, the fate of Middle Easternism will be
decided not only on the clarity of its views or the attractiveness
of its catchwords and premises, but also by the degree of real-
life cooperation and/or resolution of divergences between the
countries of the region. This is going to be influenced to a large
degree by what the enemies of this idea, notably the Islamicists,
do. In addition, there are the consequences of domestic develop-
ments. Purely internal events — like the recent Israeli elections
with their eventual impact upon the future of the peace process,
or the inclusion of some Islamicists in the polity (e.g., Jordan,
Egypt, Yemen, Morocco, or Algeria) — would weigh heavily in
the balance. So would business initiatives for joint ventures,
cooperation between governments and non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) on environmental and water problems, as
well as the fight against abuse of human rights.
A vision is an important mental construct, a sort of compass
to help human collectivities chart a course in tumultuous
waters, and a guide for decision-making in times of uncertainty.
The inner magnetism or contradictions of the four visions dis-
cussed above are no doubt important. Still, the dialogue of
actions they develop in a challenging environment is what
would determine their impact upon the lives of the peoples of
the Middle East and North Africa.
Notes
1. This is a poem published in Al-Hayat (28 October 1994).
2. This was published in the cycle Enraging Poems (Beirut: Manshurat Nizar
Kabbani, 1987).
3. Mustafa al-Fiqqi, Al-Sharq Awsatiyya (Cairo: Madbuli, 1994).
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